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P.A. Ogwuma, OFR

Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria
The establishment of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was motivated by the need
to have an appropriate financial environment for development. When it was established it was charged specifically with the responsibility of contributing to growth
and development through the provision of financial services. Although the law
establishing it has undergone some changes over the years, the immediate functions
for its establishment remain the same.
They include the issuance of legal tender currency, maintenance and management
of external reserves, promotion of monetary stability and sound financial structure,
provision of banking services to banks, and acting as banker and adviser to the
government. Backed by its legal powers and in response to the macroeconomic
environment, the CBN evolved monetary and banking policy measures over the
years to discharge its statutory and non-statutory functions.
The objective of this paper is to examine the various monetary and banking policy
measures which the CBN had applied both in the past and now in carrying out its
functions and the role banking legislation plays in this regard. To this end, the paper
is organised in four parts. Part I examines the legal and macroeconomic environment
in which the Bank discharges its responsibilities. Part II reviews the measures taken
by the CBN over the years in performing its functions while Part llI identifies the
problems which constrains CBN's performance, the external influences which cause
or aggravate these problems and the role which banking legislation could play in
resolving them. Part IV provides the summary and conclusion.

I. LEGAL AND MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The role of a Central Bank is better understood in the context of the economy in which
it operates. Consequently, a review of the CBN's legal framework and macroeconomic setting would enhance our understanding of the role of the Bank in the
Nigerian economy.
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Legal Framework
The main source of the legal authority of the CBN in discharging its responsibilities
is the Central· Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 24 of 1991 which supersedes the Central
Bank of Nigeria Act of 1958 and its amendments. The Decree, like the repealed Act,
states the basic or immediate objectives of the Bank, as highlighted earlier, which arc
designed to develop the financial sector and thereby enhance the growth and
development and stability of the economy. The new CBN Decree has ·strengthened
the powers of the Bank as the agency of the government charged with the responsibility for maintaining monetary stability ansi sound financial structure.
Furthermore, the Decree makes the Bank subject only to the authority of the
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in contrast to the previous arrangement
by which CBN had to report to the President through the Ministry of Finance.
The second major source of the CBN's legal authority is the Banks and ·other
Financial Ins ti tu tions (BOFI) Decree 1991 which replaced the Banking Decree of 1969
and it<; subsequent amendments. The current Decree, like the repealed counterpart,
is designed to provide effective regulation of financial institutions. The CBN and the
BOFI Decrees, with the rclevantstatutcs and occasional directives from the regulatory
authorities, provide part of the environment which has influenced the pattern and
direction of Central Bank policy measures. The other part is dictated by
macroeconomic policies and developments.
Macroeconomic Environment
For a better appreciation of CBN's policy measures, it is necessary to note the
structural changes in the economy. As you are aware, following the discovery of oil
in the late 1950's and its commercial and large-scale exploitation, especially since the
early 1970's, agriculture lost its leading position to the mining sector. Endowed with
resources derived from crude oil, the government became the prime mover of the
economy as it adopted the strategy of massive intervention in the economy and the
production of goods and services.
When oil revenue and hence government revenue fell following the collapse of
world oiJ prices during the world-wide recession in the early 1980's the reaction of
the government was to tighten the existing austerity measures -stringent trade and
exchange controls and regulation of the financial sector. In line with that policy
regime of controls, the CBN relied mainly on direct controls to carryout its functions.
However, with the adoption of the SAP in 1986 which emphasised greater reliance
on market forces in macroeconomic management, CBN's approach to the conduct of
monetary policy was modified to reflect the deregulatory stance.

II. POLICY MEASURES OF THE CBN
Despite the similarity of the objectives of CBN's policy measures prior to and since
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the SAP, the Bank's strategy for achieving the objectives has changed over the years
to reflect the overall policy stance and direction of the economy.
CBN' s Pre-SAP Policy Measures

As indicated earlier, in line with the stance of overall economic policy prior to the
SAP, the CBN relied on direct controls to carry out its statutory and non-statutory
responsibilities of contributing to economic growth and development through the
development of the financial sector. The policy measures adopted by the CBN prior
to the SAP to tackle these responsibilities q'luld be grouped into two, namely,
domestic monetary and banking policy and external sector policy.
Monetary and Banking Policy

Monetary and banking policy has been designed to foster macroeconomic stability
and a sound financial structure. In the Pre-SAP period, there was a vast arsenal of
instruments for the execution of monetary and banking policy which included the
following: cash reserve requirement, liquidity ratio, special deposit, stabilization
securities, direct regulation of interest rates, direct credit controls, moral suasion and
general directives. Furthermore, the CBN adopted a policy of influencing the
developmental process by promoting money and capital markets, development
banks and related institutions and schemes.
External Sector Policy

In line with the government policy which favo ured stringent trade and exchange
controls in order to keep prices of goods at affordable levels, the CBN pursued the
policy of administratively fixing the exchange rate, thereby shielding it from market
forces. At the same time, the Bank sought to maintain adequate volume of external
reserves to preserve the international value of the domestic currency.
The fixing of the exchange rate resulted in the fostering of imports and import
dependency while penalizing domestic production. Consequently, imporl'- increased
excessively, payment arrears accumulated and non-oil exports declined.
CBN's Policy Measures and Strategies Since the SAP

With the adoption of the economic reform package under the aegis of the SAP by the
government, the direction of the CBN policies and measures increasingly reflected
the deregulatory stance of the package. Consequently, the CBN started to rely more
on market forces in the design and implementation of its m·onetary, banking and
external sector policies.
(a)

Monetary and Financial Sector Management

The main objectives of policy since the inception of the SAP were: moderation of
inflation; increased domestic savings and efficient resource allocation; improved
capital inflow; increased local production and employment; increased earnings from
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non-oil exports; enhanced external reserves; and stable naira exchange rate.
To achieve the broad objectives highlighted above, a number of policy instruments
or measures were adopted. These measures could be grouped broadly into three,
namely: credit, interest rate, and other financial sector policies.
(i)

Credit Policy Measures

Credit ceiling, a major instrument of monetary policy prior to the SAP, remained
important under the SAP until September 199~ when it was lifted for banks whose
performances were considered sound. To maintain an appropriate monetary growth
which would ensure stability in both the domestic and external sectors of the
economy, credit ceiling was adjusted to deal with perceived excessive or deficient
credit in the system as deemed necessary.
In addition to credit control through credit ceiling, indirect measures to reduce the
ability of banks to extend new loans included the recall of naira counterpart of
outstanding payment arrears from banks to the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1987,
mopping up excess liquidity by the re-introduction and modification of stabilization
securities since October 1990, increase in commercial banks' cash ratio in 1989 and
1990 and the introduction of cash ratio for merchant banks in 1990. Furthermore,
within the context of economic liberation, the sectoral credit guidelines were
reformed to give banks the much needed flexibility in their credit operations.
Effective September 1992, indirect methods of credit and monetary control received
a boost with the selective lifting of credit ceilings for banks which had met the
performance criteria. In June 1993, Open Market Operations (OMO), designed for the
conduct of indirect monetary and credit policy, commenced in a modest way.
Experience from the first eleven sessions of OMO shows that the treasury securities
sold out of Central Bank portfolio were consistently over-subscribed, and there had
been less reliance on the use of stabilisation securities.
(ii)

lnkrest Rate Mcasw·es

Interest rate management under the SAP departed radically from the pattern of the
past when interest rates were administratively fixed. The policy based on market
forces was necessitated by the need to promote competition in the finance industry
as well as enhance efficient resource allocation. In August 1987, all controls on bank
deposit and lending rates were abolished while the CBN continued to fix the rediscount rate to indicate the direction of interest rate changes. After the re-introduction
of some forms of control in January, 1991, all controls on deposit and lending rates
were abolished in 1992. However, banks were enjoined to observe a maximum of 5
percentage points between their average cost of funds and their maximum lending
rates merely as a performance criterion.
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(iii) Other Financial Sedor Measures

In line with measures taken by the government to encourage the growth of banks
and other financial institutions, the CBN stepped up its traditional and developmental functions and set in motion measures to reorganise the sector so that it could play
its role under a deregulated economy. Efforts made to strengthen the system include:
raising of the capital base of banks; improving the structure of regulation and
-..upervision; adoption of mandatory uniform accounting standards and prudential
guidelines; identification of ailing banks and adopting a programme for the resolution of their problems; adoption of the auction system for issuing treasury securities;
and the establishment of discount houses.
(b)

Foreign Exchange Management

CBN's foreign exchange management policy seeks to maintain adequate level of
fort'ign exchange rese rves and an appropriate naira exchange rate consistent with
al1ucative efficiency. Under the deregulatory stance of the SAP, the Bank's determination of the naira exchange rate has been subjected to market factors. In this connection, there had been experimentation with several techniques of conducting the
foreign exchange market between 1987 and 1992 to facilitate the achievement of
policy objectives. Eventually, on March 5, 1992, the policy of complete deregulation
of the FEM was announced in response to the emergence of a large parallel market
premium and abuses by many operators. Consequently, the existing foreign exchange system v,hlS to be replaced by an inter-bank foreign exchange market where
au tl1llrised dealers and the CBN were expected to buy and sell foreign exchange. The
role of the CBN was mainly to intervene to sell or buy foreign exchange in order to
stabilise the existing rate. The new policy was not fully implemented because of the
continued dl'preciation of the naira exchange rate as the supply of foreign exchange
continued to lag behind demand. The factors which militated against Central Bank
nwasurcs arc considered in the next section along with other constraints to policy.

III. CONSTRAINTS TO THE CENTRAL BANK'S PERFORMANCE
ln spite of some gains madt" through CB N's role in Nigeria's recent economic reforms,
the desired objectives, such as stability and rapid growth with minimal unemployment, are still elusive because of a number of constraints. These are reviewed briefly.
(a)

Rapid Grov.1:h in Liquidity

Rapid growth in liquidity has impacted adversely on the naira exchange rate and
domestic price level. Although excess liquidity during the period is linked immediately with the monetisation of foreign exchange and rapid growth in aggregate credit,
the real problems are those factors which influence these monetary aggregates. The
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greatest problem in this respect is the financing of large government deficits by the
CBN.
(b}

High Interest Rates

Another problem is the prevailing high interest rate regime. Although interest rate
deregulation has stimulated competition and efficiency in resources allocation thereby paving the way for indirect monetary control, it has nevertheless encouraged high
lending rates which are detrimental to investment in fixed plant and equipment and
therefore anti-growth. The high lending rates could have been lower than the current
level but for the oligopolistic structure which permits a few banks to act as the prime
suppliers of funds to the market. The rise in the number of insolvent banks has
worsened the situation because such banks had engaged in distress (desperate)
borrowing at phenomenally high rates in order to stay afloat.
(c)

Financing of Federal Government Deficits by the CBN

The greatest problem which has severely constrained the effectiveness of monetary
and banking policies in Nigeria in the last few years has been the persistence of large
government deficits and its mandatory financing by the CBN. The financing of
government deficil<; by the CBN increases the monetary base and the level of excess
liquidity of the banking system. A re lated problem is the mandatory role of the CBN
in the underwriting of primary issues of government securities thereby constraining
the CBN's ability to regulate reserves.
(d)

Exchange Rate Depreciation and Inadequate Inflow of Foreign Exchange

The fall in the value of the naira exchange rate over the years has been a source of
serious concern. Despite the reforms so far, the naira exchange rate has remained
unstable and therefore not conducive to planning. Besides, the margin be tween the
official m.:irket and par.:illel market rates, which was narrowed by the 5th March, 1992
exchange rate action, has since widened substantially while the inflow of foreign
exchange has remained inadequate. This state of affairs may continue as long as the
constraints to inflnw rl'main while expansionary influences on domestic liquidity
persist.
(e)

Legal Constraints

One of the major problems of the CBN in discharging its responsibilities is the
inadPquacy of legal provisions. For example, despite the fact that insolvent banks
\Vere identified before 1990, it was only in 1991 that the law was ame nded to give the
CBN some of the necessary authority to deal with such banks. Similarly, although it
is generally accepted that the Central Bank would function more effectively (especially in the pursuit of an anti-inflation mandate) if granted full independence subject
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only to the country's National Assembly, no legislative initiJtive hi.ls been tJken in
thilt direction. Since monetary and banking policies and measures are dynamic in
nJturc, the enabling legal environment should also be responsive to emerging needs
Jnd circumstJnces.
(f)

Other Constraints

A number of other constraints for which considerable progress had been mJde to
resolve Jre scarcity of professionJl staff, data constraint, inadequate computerisation,
and undeveloped integrated electronic information system.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This pi.lper has reviewed CB N's efforts within the broad context of economic mJnagement. To that end, the paper had reviewed tht> background, st.rnce, objectives and
problems of monetary policy measures before the SAP in 1986 and the need to change
the stance of policies following the adoption of the SAP by the government. The
efforts mJde by the CBN to align it,;; policies were examined rn:xt, with particular
reference to monetary, financial and external sector policies. Finally, it \vas noted that
some constraints had continued to bedevil the conduct of monetary policy and
undermine its effectiveness.
In conclusion it would be appropriate to say that the pros pcct of the CB N's policies
and measures would depend largely on: ability to dl',11 with the constraints to
effective domestic liquidity management, cspeci.:illy thl.:' mandatory financing of
fiscJI deficits by the CBN; success in shifting the undl·rwriting uf government debt
instruments to the private sector; prompt response in lq;isla tion to support desirable
changes in money and banking policies; success in measures being taken to stimulate
competition in the supply of funds to the money market and to resolve the problems
of insolvent banks; and the speed with which the inadequacies in money and banking
infrastructure Me addressed.

